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Four Free Speech Goals for
Trademark Law
William McGeveran*
Trademarks constrain the use of language. Some disputes
about trademarks thus involve serious arguments about the
defendant’s right to engage in free speech. The case that serves as
the impetus for this panel, Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey,1 is an
especially shocking example of a district court enjoining
substantive noncommercial speech in the name of preserving the
value of a trademark. It was so shocking that protests and amicus
briefs poured in from bloggers, law professors, and advocacy
groups of every stripe, including Eugene Volokh, Mark Lemley,
Larry Lessig, David Post, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
many others.2 It was so shocking that the appeals court promptly
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2818. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I have received helpful
comments about this project from many people, especially Barton Beebe, Dan Burk, Tom
Cotter, Stacey Dogan, Eric Goldman, Laura Heymann, Mark McKenna, and participants
in the Fifth Annual Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium at Washington
College of Law, American University. I also benefited from the questions and insights of
participants at this symposium, particularly my fellow panelists Sonia Katyal, Brett
Frischmann, and Robert Weisbein. I am grateful for research assistance from L. Ashley
Aull and David Biggs. Some early research on these issues was conducted as part of a
fellowship at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School.
1
Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g Freecycle
Network, Inc. v. Oey, No. CV 06-173, Preliminary Injunction Order (D. Ariz. May 11,
2006).
2
See Brief for 38 Intell. Prop. Professors and the Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Freecycle, 505 F.3d 898 (No. 06-16219), available at
http://www.volokh.com/files/freecyclelemleybrief.pdf; Brief of James Boyle et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Freecycle, 505 F.3d 898 (No. 06-16219), available
at http://www.volokh.com/files/freecyclepostbrief.pdf; Posting of Eugene Volokh to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/posts/chain_1190828574.shtml (July 14,
2006, 18:03 EST).
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reversed the injunction and concluded that the plaintiff had
completely failed to show the required likelihood of success on the
merits.3 It was shocking, and so the Freecycle case became a
cause célèbre—not because it was typical, but because it was
unusual.
There is no shortage of law review articles and books warning
that overly broad interpretations of trademark rights imperil free
speech values.4 I share their sense of concern, yet the eventual
decisions in almost all recent controversial cases protected speech,5
just as the Ninth Circuit did in Freecycle. When courts finally
reach the merits, these cases suggest, the defendant’s free speech
arguments ultimately carry the day.6 This does not mean that all is
well. It does mean, however, that we need to focus on the true free
speech problem in trademark law.
That problem arises because only a tiny fraction of disputes
actually reach litigation and become eligible for a happy ending
like the one we saw in the Freecycle case. Moreover, their
holdings tend to be tied closely to their facts and so offer limited
value as precedent. Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that
the real action occurs outside the courthouse: markholders send
cease-and-desist letters and threaten legal action against those
using trademarks to facilitate speech, and the recipients frequently

3

Freecycle, 505 F.3d at 906 & n.15.
See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL
CULTURE (2005); KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®: OVERZEALOUS
COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY (2005); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
5
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
6
See, e.g., id.; BidZirk, L.L.C. v. Smith, No. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445
(D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007); see also Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech,
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004); Sarah Mazzie-Briscoe, Free Speech v. Trademark
Rights: Has the Weather Changed? (March 19, 2006), http://www.chillingeffects.org/
weather.cgi?WeatherID=540 (noting a possible trend of improvement in courts’
deference to free speech concerns in cybersquatting cases).
4
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capitulate.7 We need not devote too much energy to improving the
courts’ ability to reach the correct substantive outcomes in the final
judgment at the end of a lawsuit. They already do. Rather, the
priority should be restructuring the relevant doctrines to reduce the
pre-litigation chilling effect. My objective here is to discuss four
normative goals to guide those doctrinal improvements (Part I),
and to make some extremely preliminary suggestions about what
the relevant parts of trademark law might look like as a result (Part
II).
I.
A. Balance Between Economic and Expressive Values
The first normative objective, when stated simply, encapsulates
the whole problem of using trademarks to engage in speech: the
doctrine must balance interests in source identification and in
unfettered expression. This search for equilibrium has been part of
trademark jurisprudence since its earliest days.8 Despite other
shortcomings, existing doctrine eventually strikes this balance
most of the time.
We all understand the economic function of trademarks as
important shorthand to help consumers identify with accuracy the
products they want to buy.9 So, for example, my young daughter

7

James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007); MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL
35–36
(2005),
available
at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/
WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; see Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: Search the Database,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (database with
examples of legal threats against trademark holders); Citizen Media Law Project Legal
Threats Database, http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited Feb. 26, 2008)
(same).
8
See, e.g., Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142
(Mass. 1899) (Holmes, J.) (“The two desiderata cannot both be had to their full extent,
and we have to fix the boundaries as best we can.”).
9
See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64
(1995); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley,
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and I both prefer SKIPPY creamy peanut butter to others.10 As I
hurry through the supermarket I know that, if I grab the jar of
peanut butter with a turquoise cap and the SKIPPY brand name in
a red paintbrush font, we will both be satisfied with our
sandwiches. If an interloper could use a similar name and
packaging to trick me into buying some competing inferior peanut
butter, several undesirable results would occur. For one, my
daughter might not eat her lunch.11 As a result, my family might
erroneously discard our preference for SKIPPY in the future
(unless I later realized I’d been duped). The maker of SKIPPY12
would lose my patronage through no fault of its own. The
imposter would get my money unjustly through subterfuge. And
finally, if this sort of misappropriation of customers happened
routinely, a producer might find it no longer worthwhile even to
attempt to preserve the consistent creamy goodness of the product.
After all, customers who discover they like a product cannot
reliably find it again without trademarks. These are all serious
economic problems that must not be dismissed or trivialized.
The speech interest on the other pan of the scale is also
familiar. Expansive trademark protection for common words and
phrases can effectively remove them from our language, at least in
certain contexts. This has significant anticompetitive effects.13

Search Costs]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987).
10
Perhaps I am projecting; she is only four years old. But it seems that our peanut
butter tastes coincide, at least for now.
11
Or at least she may ask me repeatedly how many bites of the sandwich are necessary.
12
The maker of SKIPPY, as it happens, is a corporation called CPC International that
has attempted to use trademark law to silence critical commentary on a website. See CPC
Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 2000). But I don’t actually need to
know anything about CPC International, even its name, provided I know that this jar of
SKIPPY will resemble the others I have enjoyed in the past. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at
164; 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 3:9 (4th ed. 2007) (“‘source’ identified by a trademark need not be known by name to
the buyer”) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. Thus it is somewhat imprecise to
say that trademarks are source identifiers, and it might be better to call them indicators of
products’ resemblance or consistency. The “source identification” terminology is wellestablished despite its imprecision, however, and I use it here.
13
See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J.) (“If descriptive words and pictures could be appropriated without
evidence of a secondary meaning, sellers could snatch for themselves the riches of the
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Beyond the economic impact, doctrines that permit monopolization
of everyday language may also impoverish artistic, political, and
social speech. “Much useful social and commercial discourse
would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an
infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person,
company or product by using its trademark.”14 Trademarks
constrain expression most seriously of all when they allow their
holders to prevent or control discussion about themselves or their
product.15
The key here is balance. Source identification is important,
and an overly expansive doctrine that immunizes harmfully
misleading speech might disserve the public. This can be true even
in areas with great free speech sensitivity. I like to use the facts of
a little-known Massachusetts case to make this point: one month
after a Planned Parenthood abortion clinic opened, a local pro-life
group called “Problem Pregnancy” rented an office that was down
the hall and closer to the elevators, so women intending to go to
the clinic had to pass by.16 The pro-life group then posted signs on
the door reading “PP” and “Free pregnancy testing and counseling,
walk in.”17 Several women did.18 Or, to take an example from the
other end of the political spectrum, how about the case where the
Democrats in a local election wanted to rename themselves the
“Representation for Every Person Party” (or, by its initials, the
“REP Party”)?19 These examples involve political speech—often

language and make it more difficult for new entrants to identify their own products;
consumers would be worse off.”).
14
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992).
15
See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987)
(discussing the risk that “a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the
use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct”).
16
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc.,
498 N.E.2d 1044, 1045 (Mass. 1986).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 696–97 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also United We
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1997)
(enjoining New York chapter of Ross Perot’s political organization, UNITED WE
STAND AMERICA, which split off from the parent group, from operating and raising
funds under the UNITED WE STAND name).
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the sacrosanct category—but even here confusion might become
too great to be tolerated.
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court recently ruled,
sometimes we should tolerate a certain degree of potential
confusion in order to accommodate concerns about expression.20
The existence of confusion answers a factual question, but not the
normative question of whether eliminating that confusion is more
important than any other values.21 Indeed, no one seems troubled
if the use of a functional source-indicator by two producers causes
some confusion among consumers. We have already balanced
competing values in those situations, and have structured doctrine
such that neither producer may claim a trademark monopoly. The
same type of balancing should occur when trademarks unduly
impinge on free expression.
The normal operation of trademark law typically conceals the
balancing between these two vital interests. The issue just doesn’t
come up in the paradigmatic trademark dispute. Doctrines such as
functionality, genericide, the lack of protection for merely
descriptive marks, and others help ensure that source-identification
and the public domain happily co-exist.22 In theory, when it comes
time to decide whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion
and thus liability, these threshold requirements have already
eliminated many of the purported marks that intrude too much on
the public domain. In reality, the expansion of trademark rights in
recent years undermined these initial screening mechanisms. But
when cases do slip through those nets, courts ultimately conduct
20
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP Permanent I), 543
U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (noting “[t]he common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of
confusion on the part of consumers” in light of the “undesirability of allowing anyone to
obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first”).
21
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 481 (1999)
(“[T]he issue of whether confusion should be actionable turns not merely on a factual
analysis of whether confusion exists, but on a policy determination that the type of
confusion present warrants legal intervention. Too often courts simply plug the facts of a
case into their version of the Polaroid factor test and pretend that the result is necessarily
a sensible one.”).
22
See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits
on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html (“Numerous trademark doctrines serve
to cabin the ability of trademark owners to claim licensing rights.”).
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the balancing later on by applying various doctrines, including the
core likelihood of confusion test as well as special standards such
as the nominative use analysis23 or one of several types of defenses
based on the First Amendment.24 Occasionally, courts find a
defendant’s speech-related uses of a mark so confusing that
trademark limitations ought to apply, although most final decisions
favor the defendant. Whatever the outcome, the balancing does
occur—eventually.
B. Integration of First Amendment Requirements
Traditionally, trademark infringement rulings did not violate
the First Amendment because misleading or deceptive commercial
The courts
speech receives no constitutional protection.25
currently define “commercial speech,” as speech that “does no
more than propose a commercial transaction” in a manner
“removed from any exposition of ideas.”26 Many uses of
trademarks in today’s culture go far beyond the boundaries of such
purely commercial speech.27
They can involve political
expression,28 artistic works,29 parodies,30 or criticism31. These
situations generate much more significant constitutional concerns.

23

See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d
Cir. 2005); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
24
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002); Hormel
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod’ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1987).
25
See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15
(1979); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165–
66 (1982).
26
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
27
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 400.
28
See, e.g., MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
1046, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan,
266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s
Coal. for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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This does not mean, however, that we should invite First
Amendment balancing into the workaday functioning of trademark
cases. Judge Pierre Leval has argued forcefully and correctly for
the “internalization” of First Amendment requirements within the
structures of trademark law.32 The general precept that judges
should avoid unnecessary constitutional decision-making has
achieved nearly axiomatic status in our legal system.33 The
problems associated with unnecessary constitutional decisions are
well-known. They freeze the development of law—particularly
regrettable in the setting of the Lanham Act, which relies on
incremental judicial interpretation of flexible common-law
standards. They end the dialogue between the judiciary and the
legislature because Congress cannot amend the statute in response
to rulings it disfavors.34 And there is no reason to believe that
whatever precedents emerge from a constitutional analysis will
function any better than those fashioned as common law in
response to underlying policy concerns.35

29

See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012
(C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v.
DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New
Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
30
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 2002); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
31
See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007); CPC Int’l,
Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000); BidZirk, L.L.C. v. Smith, No. 6:06109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. 2007).
32
Leval, supra note 6, at 188–89.
33
See Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 204–05 & n.50 (1985)
(interpreting Investment Advisors Act to avoid conflict with First Amendment).
34
Congress has shown no reluctance to do so in the sphere of trademark law. See, e.g.,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (reversing
result in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that federal
trademark law requires actual dilution, which Victoria’s Secret failed to prove)); Barton
Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1154–55 (2006) (describing Trademark Dilution Revision
Act as response to Moseley and a product of cooperation among Congress, bar
associations, academics, and civil society organizations).
35
See Leval, supra note 6, at 209.
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Like other statutes, trademark laws should be interpreted to
avoid any collisions with constitutional doctrine.36
This
internalization has happened in other doctrines like genericism and
functionality, as discussed earlier.37 A trademark fair use doctrine
that similarly internalizes the requirements of the First Amendment
can protect speech without the negative effects of excessive
constitutionalization.38 Courts that followed such a rule would
have no legitimate need to look beyond it for a constitutionally
acceptable outcome. This is one of the successes of the copyright
fair use defense.39 The First Amendment only appears in those
cases as a rhetorical flourish, because the balance between the
copyright monopoly and free speech is woven into the fabric of the
Copyright Act already through, among other things, its fair use
doctrine.40
As Judge Leval laments, in the absence of such internalized
free speech principles, many cases involving trademarks and free
expression turn instead to free-form quasi-constitutional balancing,
without much guidance from either trademark law or First
Amendment precedents.41 These cases generally end with wellbalanced results, but only on the basis of poorly-articulated
constitutional justifications.42 Trademark doctrine, like copyright

36

See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(avoiding interpretation of Lanham Act that would suggest Congress had
unconstitutionally “created a species of perpetual patent and copyright”); Universal
Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) (“anti-dilution
laws should be interpreted to provide breathing room for First Amendment concerns”);
Leval, supra note 6, at 202–08 (reviewing trademark cases based on how well they avoid
needless constitutional rulings).
37
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
38
Contra Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 887, 919–20 (2005) (criticizing courts that “have resorted to the fair use doctrine to
protect First Amendment interests” rather than applying a direct constitutional analysis).
39
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
40
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains
built-in First Amendment accommodations.”).
41
Leval, supra note 6, at 202–04, 210.
42
See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod’ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir.
1996); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); E.S.S.
Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006),
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doctrine, should function in harmony with First Amendment
requirements and avoid ad hoc constitutional determinations.
C. Predictability and Clarity
From the perspective of an accused infringer who has used a
trademark merely for purposes of aiding expression, these first two
goals are high-minded principles of little direct salience. The
would-be defendant’s immediate concern is finding out how to
avoid liability cleanly and efficiently. A doctrine that is malleable
and unclear, or that requires lengthy litigation for resolution, will
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the chilling effect; it either
discourages legitimate expression with trademarks to begin with,
or it compels the defendant to withdraw speech when threatened
with suit. The next two free speech goals address these more
concrete problems. They are both areas where existing doctrine
fails miserably.
If you have ever tried to counsel a client who wishes to use a
trademark for expression then you have confronted the deeply
muddled state of the law governing such uses. There are many
routes to a final adjudication, but none is clear and it is difficult to
know in advance which ones a court might employ. I’d even
speculate that the tangled nature of the doctrine may discourage
attorneys from offering pro bono help that might otherwise be
available to some of the artists and parodists who most need
advice.
Most obviously, the defendant may try to defeat the prima facie
case of likelihood of confusion. Judge Leval, for one, suggests that
the likelihood of confusion test offers as much protection as
necessary for free speech.43 There are several problems with
reliance on likelihood of confusion alone. First, this analysis is
notoriously murky and pliable even in typical trademark cases;44 it
may be impossible to anticipate in advance how confusing a judge
appeal docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc.,
112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
43
Leval, supra note 6, at 188–89, 202–04.
44
See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761–64
(2004); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2006).
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will find your client’s parody of, or allusion to, a trademark. Also,
the test was designed for other situations entirely and a number of
key factors have little bearing on the comparison between a
commercially valuable trademark and a speech-focused use of that
mark.45 Finally, as I state above, we sometimes need to tolerate
some confusion for the sake of speech.46
A defendant who has used a trademark for speech purposes
may try instead to invoke a number of defenses on that basis.
Those I have in mind are distinct from threshold definitional
hurdles like genericism and functionality, or from arguments that
the allegedly infringing use did not satisfy a requirement limiting
liability to using the mark “as a mark.”47 My list would include:
•
•

The “descriptive use” defense under § 33(b)(4) of the
Lanham Act;48
The “nominative use” doctrine originated by Judge
Alex Kozinski in New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc;49

•

A defense for truthful comparative advertising;50 and

45
See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224–25 (3d Cir.
2005); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
46
See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. The relatively few final judicial
decisions in the last 15 years or so that clearly overprotected trademarks at the expense of
speech often did so because of excessive deference to the confusion-prevention purposes
of trademarks. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th
Cir. 1994) (finding infringement because the parody of a MICHELOB beer advertisement
might have confused the “superficial observer”).
47
There is now an ongoing argument among trademark scholars concerning the
existence and importance of such a requirement in trademark law. Compare, e.g.,
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of ‘Trademark Use,’ 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 9; Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law],
with Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Mark McKenna, Trademark Use and the
Problem of Source in Trademark Law (Jan. 18, 2008) (unpublished draft, on file with
author). I find persuasive McKenna’s argument that any such requirement ultimately
collapses into a different articulation of likelihood of confusion, but this complex issue is
beyond the scope of my more modest discussion here.
48
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
49
971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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•

Several different flavors of “First Amendment”
defenses, particularly those emerging from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi.51
This tangle of doctrines suffers from many problems of clarity.
First, the boundaries between the various doctrines blur. Second,
the requirements of each are vague and courts often apply them
inconsistently, both within and between different jurisdictions
(either different states or different circuits in the federal court
system).
Third, different jurisdictions adopt different
combinations of doctrines.
The first of these problems, blur between the doctrines, is
evident from terminology alone. All five doctrines are sometimes
referred to as “fair use,” which is borrowed from the rather
dissimilar fair use defense codified in copyright law.52 Yet none of
them has the same scope or flexibility of the copyright fair use
doctrine. Beyond the name they use, different courts and
commentators mix and match these doctrines somewhat
haphazardly. Professor McCarthy, in his influential treatise,
presents comparative advertising as one form of nominative use
and insists in turn that nominative use should not be an affirmative
defense at all, but only a different heuristic for analyzing
likelihood of confusion.53 He discusses all those doctrines as part
of likelihood of confusion, but takes up each of the others from my
list in entirely different chapters, and even volumes, of his work.54
50

See, e.g., Societe Comptoir de L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
51
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
52
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
53
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 23:62, 23:63, 23:69; see also Chad J. Doellinger,
Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 5, ¶ 9 (2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v1/n1/5
(“[N]ominative fair use should be nothing more than a term used to describe a peculiar
fact pattern that, given the specific facts of the case, does not lead to a likelihood of
confusion.”). As McCarthy acknowledges, the circuits split on this point. Compare
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005)
(adopting nominative use as an affirmative defense), with Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,
292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that nominative use is a substitute test for
likelihood of confusion).
54
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 11:45 et seq. (§ 33(b)(4) “fair use” defense);
4 id. at §§ 24:124 et seq. (“fair use” statutory defenses to trademark dilution); 6 id. at
§§ 31:139 et seq. (“free speech defense”).
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Another leading treatise sprinkles these defenses among others
such as statutes of limitations, and while at one point it calls
nominative fair use “a judge-made variation on the statutory fair
use doctrine,” elsewhere it warns that the two are completely
distinct.55 In their casebook, Professors Dinwoodie and Janis
group everything on my list (and others) in a chapter about
“permissible uses of another’s trademarks.”56 A well-known
deskbook groups them in a similar way, but then, like McCarthy’s
treatise, describes all of them as variants of likelihood of confusion
analysis.57 Courts are no more clear. Many bounce back and forth
between the quite distinct precedents on § 33(b)(4) and nominative
fair use, unaware of the resulting inconsistencies.58 This may not
be surprising, because even the most conscientious courts find the
distinction between § 33(b)(4) and nominative use difficult to
apply.59 Meanwhile, other judges simply devise their own
imprecise variations on “fair use.”60
Because it is so difficult to predict in advance which doctrines
may come into play and how they will work, those contemplating
use of a trademark in speech (or lawyers advising them) must
consider potential liability under all possible scenarios. Similarly,
a party actually sued over an expressive trademark use must
engage in defensive kitchen-sink pleading and briefing, relying on
55

3-11 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §§ 11.08[3][d], 11.08[3][k]
(2007).
56
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LAW AND POLICY 663–742 (2d ed. 2007).
57
1-8 BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
DESKBOOK § 8.06 (2007); see id. at § 8.06[1] (“The salient principle governing the legal
propriety of using another’s trademark is simply that of truthfulness and the absence of
any likelihood of deception.”); see also BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 335, 335–57 (5th ed. 2002) (same).
58
See, e.g., Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. THQ, Inc., No. CV-05-1134-PHX-SMM, 2008
WL 215827, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008).
59
See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (lamenting
that the “distinction often proves more frustrating than helpful”); see also Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding “[t]hese two mutually exclusive forms of fair use are equally applicable” to the
photographer’s use of the BARBIE doll trade dress in “Food Chain Barbie”).
60
See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (defendant
“asserts a defense of fair use, which means that he used the mark for a purpose other than
that for which the mark is typically used”).
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every theory that might succeed. When the same activity could be
covered by a profusion of narrowly-drawn exceptions,
harmonization merits serious consideration. Whatever the other
shortcomings of copyright fair use, at least the single codified
defense informs all parties (and judges) which doctrine controls.
Second, the various “fair use” doctrines themselves are, to put
it simply, squishy. Even the doctrines that present multi-prong
tests leave great latitude for interpretation: how is the court to
determine the requirements of descriptiveness or good faith under
§ 33(b)(4)?61 Or whether the defendant meets the conditions under
Judge Kozinski’s New Kids test for nominative use that “[f]irst, the
product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark [and] second, only so much of the
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service?”62 Worst of all are the totally unstructured
principles in the First Amendment balancing cases, as noted
earlier.
Further squishiness arises because, on closer examination,
many of the doctrines tend to collapse into likelihood of confusion
inquiries with all the attendant vagueness. The terms of § 33(b)(4)
require that the defendant’s use be “otherwise than as a mark.”63
This sounds like a restatement of the likelihood of confusion
question.64 Likewise, nominative use cases often boil down to the
requirement that the use involve “nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark holder.”65 This, too, can be viewed as a highly
factual question about the subjective confusion of consumers.
Defendants may find it even more difficult to prevail under these
61

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
For some reasonably thoughtful analysis of these two factors, but with some confusion
about which factor applies to the facts at hand, see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279
F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
63
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
64
See, e.g., Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc., No. 1:03-cv-414, 2005 WL
3088339, *20–21 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) (“The first issue is whether defendant
used the term descriptively and not as a trademark. These questions are really two sides
of the same coin.”).
65
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
62
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poorly theorized substitute standards than under the traditional test,
especially because there are fewer precedents to guide
interpretation than would be available for the established
likelihood of confusion standards.66 In both instances, the key
factor in the test really does little but restate likelihood of
confusion.
Third and finally, different jurisdictions recognize different
combinations and variations of these doctrines. While at least
three circuits have adopted a nominative use doctrine,67 others
have declined the opportunity to do so.68 The Second Circuit now
structures its First Amendment analysis as a balancing test between
confusion and speech,69 but other courts citing the Second Circuit’s
Rogers v. Grimaldi precedent deploy it as a complete defense
rather than as a countervailing factor against confusion.70 These
variations are especially nettlesome because the different circuits
all adhere to their own interpretations of federal trademark law and
because it can sometimes be difficult to predict where trademark
cases involving mass communication technology, including the
internet, can be brought if there are the requisite contacts for
jurisdiction in many states.71
To be sure, predictability and clarity are matters of degree.
The goal must be improvement, not perfection. Nonetheless,
trademark law should allow a reasonable advance judgment about
the standards a court will apply to a particular case. At the
moment this goal is nowhere close to satisfied.

66

See Doellinger, supra note 53, at ¶ 1.
See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005);
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545–47 (5th Cir. 1998); New Kids on
the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
68
See Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007);
PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003).
69
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379–80 (2d Cir.
1993).
70
E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel-MCA), 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002);
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927–28 (6th Cir. 2003); E.S.S. Entm’t
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006), appeal
docketed, No. 06-56237 (Sept. 8, 2006).
71
Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770
(1984); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).
67
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D. Faster and Less Expensive Adjudication
Returning to the vantage point of a speaker confronting the
threat of a trademark lawsuit, the length and expense of litigation
may well be the most important consideration. The prospect of a
protracted court fight that drains resources and demands time and
energy will dissuade many an author or critic from mounting a
defense. According to a wide-ranging survey conducted by the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the estimated
total median cost of the lowest-stakes category of trademark
infringement litigation in 2006 was just over a quarter of a million
dollars; in larger cases with more than a million dollars “at risk,”
that figure rose to $650,000.72 If we are to reduce the chilling
effect, faster and cheaper litigation must be a goal.
Cost is especially important because many cease-and-desist
letters from well-financed markholders target isolated individuals
using trademarks expressively.73 Even those with somewhat more
resources than a pajama-clad blogger still may have higher
priorities than preserving the supposedly infringing use of a
trademark: authors want to write books, political candidates want
to win elections, and movie moguls want to go to parties. Further
increasing the asymmetry, the contested trademark may represent
the lifeblood of a brand manager zealously guarding a trademark
portfolio, but may constitute only a part of the overall message the
defendant wished to convey.

72

AM. I.P. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007).
See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 4, at 100 (“Most small-time parodists immediately
fold when a large company accuses them of a trademark violation. Who can afford the
legal fees? . . . Typically, the inequality of economic power between corporation and
parodist tends to determine who prevails in trademark infringment lawsuits.”); Lia Miller,
Cosby’s Lawyers See No Flattery in an Imitation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at C9
(quoting web satirist who received cease-and-desist letter as saying: “Well-funded media,
offline media, they are able to do this. . . . [W]hen you are a small independent artist,
even when you know you are legally right, someone with money can strong-arm you into
bending.”); Sean Higgins, Lake-O-Be-Gone, National Review Online (Sept. 28, 2005),
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/higgins200509280816.asp (reporting that
recipient of cease-and-desist letter is “not eager to test” potential fair use defense and
instead complied with letter); see also MCLEOD, supra note 4, at 184–85, 212–14
(discussing responsiveness of intermediaries such as movie studios and internet service
providers to litigation threats); Gibson, supra note 7, at 913 (same).
73
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Usually, then, recipients of cease-and-desist demands
capitulate. The few stories of those who do not give up are
instructive. Tom Forsythe, an art photographer, confronted
Mattel’s objection to his series of works entitled “Food Chain
Barbie,” which “portray a nude Barbie in danger of being attacked
by vintage household appliances.”74 He spent five months
searching for legal representation and reports that a “long list of
attorneys suggested I just give up, since I hadn’t made any money
anyway.”75 The ACLU finally agreed to represent him and
enlisted a large California law firm to handle the case pro bono.76
The overall defense costs for the litigation, which included closelyintegrated trademark and copyright claims, eventually topped two
million dollars.77
Litigating the likelihood of confusion question is a long, factintensive, and expensive process. It often involves the use of
survey evidence, which runs up the bill quickly. Courts consider
its highly-factual nature frequently inappropriate for summary
judgment.78 As noted above, numerous free speech cases turn on
the analysis of this arduous test.
Worse, some judges combine the distinct doctrines aimed at
protecting speech interests with the likelihood of confusion
inquiry, resulting in an even longer analysis. Courts in the Second
Circuit usually combine a full likelihood of confusion test with
special Rogers v. Grimaldi considerations related to free
74

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Mattel-Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792,
796 (9th Cir. 2003).
75
Tom Forsythe, Artsurdism, www.tomforsythe.com/bio_foodchain.cfm (last visited
Feb. 29, 2008).
76
Id.
77
See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, MattelWalking Mountain, No. CV99-85432RSWL(RZX), 2004 WL 1454100 (C.D. Cal. June
21, 2004) (awarding defendant $1,584,089 in legal fees and $241,797.09 in costs);
Forsythe, supra note 75 (stating that appeals fees and costs of approximately $300,000
added to trial court figures for at total of $2.1 million total in fees and costs). Feeshifting such as occurred in the “Food Chain Barbie” case is relatively unusual in
trademark law, where only “exceptional cases” justify such awards. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(2000).
78
See Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001);
Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2001); 3 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS, supra note 12, at § 32:120–21 (collecting cases showing presumption
against summary judgment).
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expression.79 The Ninth Circuit, even after the Supreme Court
held in KP Permanent that the presence of confusion did not
foreclose the § 33(b)(4) defense for descriptive uses, nevertheless
remanded that case to the district court to conduct the full
likelihood of confusion review, just in case it might shed light on
the § 33(b)(4) analysis.80
The Third Circuit adopted the
nominative fair use test, but mandated that a court must always
first conduct a modified (but not really simplified) likelihood of
confusion analysis.81
Even without combining the doctrines, routine judicial
management decisions can have the same prolonging effect. If a
court defers all summary judgment motions and hears them
together at the end of a fixed discovery period, then both sides
must marshal the evidence and arguments to support their view of
likelihood of confusion, regardless of any affirmative defenses that
might have disposed of the case more simply and with less
discovery. Similar results follow if a court simultaneously
considers all matters related to a motion for preliminary injunction,
often decided after extensive discovery.
Finally, aside from the sequence in which courts consider
issues, the unclear standards explored in Section C magnify the
expense and length of court fights. Fighting on multiple doctrinal
fronts requires more pricey lawyer time. Dealing with unclear and
fact-intensive standards likewise presents more difficult, and
therefore more expensive, legal tasks. (Similar delay arises where
the inquiry collapses into likelihood of confusion, since the
defendant must offer much of the same evidence for both
likelihood of confusion and these other doctrines anyway and may
79

See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379–80 (2d
Cir. 1993); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
80
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (KP Permanent II), 408
F.3d 596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005).
81
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).
Ironically, the court said it adopted this structure to help defendants, because it kept the
initial burden of proof on plaintiffs. Id. at 223, 232. This may be true in a formal sense,
but most defendants in these cases would prefer to carry that burden on a quick and
simple defense rather than endure a lengthy discovery process to adjudicate plaintiff’s
burden on likelihood of confusion first.
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end up arguing over fundamentally similar standards.) Addressing
the interrelated problems of legal clarity and predictability should,
in turn, help speed adjudication and keep down costs. Addressing
one goal advances the other one too.
In practical terms, if the legal defenses available for speech
require substantial investment by speakers, a chilling effect will
result. Yet just a little more attention to the structural features of
those defenses could bring us much closer to the goal of speedy
adjudication. This change may do more than any other to
empower speech that uses trademarks.
E. Summary of Free Speech Goals
Only one of the four goals I have discussed animates current
law. That is the goal related to substantive legal issues: the
balance between competing values of source identification and free
expression. This goal should remain paramount, but not to the
exclusion of the others. Constitutional avoidance has deteriorated
in recent years as open-ended First Amendment reasoning became
more common. The two more procedural goals have also been
neglected. Procedural changes will do more to protect speech than
would complete renovation of the substantive rules.
It may fairly be argued that confusing legal standards or
inequality of power are endemic problems in many areas of the law
and are no worse here. I would disagree with this comparative
assessment. But more fundamentally, even if this characterization
is right, it does not mean that we should settle for the current state
of affairs and its speech-suppressing consequences. Rather,
trademark doctrine should aim to satisfy all four of the free speech
goals discussed here. If we started from scratch today to design
the law of trademark fair use, we should begin with these four
goals and pay special attention to doctrinal structure.
II.
Turning goals into doctrines is the tough part. Nevertheless,
more attention to the full range of free speech goals—not merely
trying to reach the correctly balanced result—should help us see
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the big picture. And from that, we can learn some lessons that will
be useful in the next stage of this project.82 This Essay is not the
place to finish the job, but I can suggest some starting points.
First of all, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that we
should uncouple trademark fair use doctrines as much as possible
from the canonical likelihood of confusion test. Let me be sure to
emphasize that the balance between source identification and
confusion remains crucial—goal number one, in fact. But striking
that balance doctrinally through the likelihood of confusion
standard (or other standards that reduce to much the same thing)
often causes too much obscurity and delay. Likelihood of
confusion reasoning satisfies the first goal but directly thwarts the
third and fourth. If the structure of a doctrine systematically chills
the very speech it aims to protect, then it must be reconsidered.
While the hard cases may reach the likelihood of confusion stage,
it should be a final hurdle for borderline fact patterns, not the first
line of defense for free speech.
Some courts and commentators are moving toward a different
doctrinal solution based on explicit First Amendment balancing.
This approach has some potential advantages over likelihood of
confusion reasoning (although as I’ve pointed out, it is often used
in conjunction with that reasoning anyhow). But it also fails to
satisfy the four goals outlined here. The Rogers v. Grimaldi test83
and all its variants engage in problematic and unnecessary
constitutional decision-making.
Their reliance on ethereal
standards make the predictability and clarity of the law even
worse. So, on at least two of the four goals enunciated here, the
newly popular First Amendment doctrine moves backwards.
So, what would be better? Ideally, we would structure our new
doctrine so that the defendant could invoke it earlier in litigation
with less need for factually-based determinations and the resulting
discovery and experts. This ideal defense would function as a
“gatekeeper” that could efficiently screen out legitimate expressive
uses of trademarks whose communicative value likely outweighed
82

See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
83
875 F.2d 994, 997–1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
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any source identification value at stake.84 A clearly applicable
affirmative defense would also serve as a powerful shield against
cease-and-desist demands from markholders. A response that
advances such a crisp doctrine, rather than citing in the alternative
to a series of amorphous precedents, could end the dispute without
litigation, but this time in the defendant’s favor.
How should such defenses work? I think there is promise in
the development of some categorical safe harbors. The best
example of this approach in current trademark doctrine is the
relatively new set of statutory carve-outs from liability under
federal dilution law (which do not apply to infringement cases).85
The original carve-outs, which were part of the federal dilution
statue enacted in 1995, applied to noncommercial uses,
comparative advertising, and news reporting or commentary.86 We
could select certain types of repeat situations in which trademark
disputes with free speech implications arise, and simply remove
them from consideration. As Robert Bone has documented,
trademark law already relies on many such general rules to
“simplify the inquiry” in response to high enforcement costs,
including the administrative costs of adjudicating an issue.87 A
few marginal cases involving some confusion might escape
liability this way, but perhaps we would decide, as we have in
other aspects of trademark law, to tolerate a small amount of
confusion in exchange for other values.
I am not yet prepared to support particular examples of such
rules, but let me nominate a few possibilities to illustrate the point.
Perhaps we should consider exemptions for:

84
Cf. Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note 9, at 805 (arguing for same role for
trademark use requirement).
85
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
86
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
Unfortunately, in 2006 Congress amended the statue in a manner that severely reduced its
clarity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000), amended by The Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of 2006. The provision I am discussing in text is the old version; the new version
may have some of these advantages but will lack others.
87
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2101–02 (2004).
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“[N]ews reporting and news commentary,” an
exception already found in the federal dilution statute
that could be extended to infringement cases;
Uses within political campaigns, adapting a statutory
exemption in California’s right of publicity statute;88
Incidental use of a trademark within a work of fiction;
Evaluations of products such as reviews and rankings
aimed at informing consumers; and

•

Negative commentary, on the theory that the likelihood
of confusion is inherently lower and the dangers of
markholder control especially high.
While such blanket exemptions make the simplest rules, in
trickier cases we could also develop rebuttable presumptions,
burden-shifting, or, at least, affirmative defenses that a defendant
could raise immediately upon assembling the necessary evidence.
These might be necessary where it proves difficult to define a
category, but nonetheless we can generate a list of characteristics
that should lead to immunization. Existing defenses such as
§ 33(b)(4) presumably would continue to exist and might be
invoked for cases that were not screened out by these other
mechanisms. Finally, the most complicated cases would make it
all the way through to the likelihood of confusion analysis. Their
numbers would be fewer, however, and they would involve the sort
of closer calls that justify the lengthier examination of all the
circumstances.
The outlines of this structure already represent an improvement
over current doctrine in meeting all four free speech goals for
trademark law. (Clearly, the details need a good deal of thought.)
As a matter of substance, these types of suggestions would balance
the goals of source identification and protection for free
expression. They also internalize First Amendment imperatives in
a manner similar to copyright law, rather than indulging courts’
taste for ad hoc constitutional decision-making. At the same time,
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and accompanying text.
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doctrines of this sort offer a lot more to our imagined speaker
considering the unlicensed use of a trademark or facing a threat of
infringement litigation over a use already made.
CONCLUSION
A browse through decided cases on Westlaw might suggest
that all is well with free speech in trademark law. Such
complacence would be wrong. Getting the correct substantive
result may provide some tidy academic satisfaction, but it is only
supposed to be the instrumental means to a larger end. Right now,
that larger end is thwarted by the structure of trademark law, which
pervasively chills expression without sufficient benefit in
preventing confusion.
It is time to rethink the law of trademark fair use so that it
achieves all four free speech goals outlined here. Those goals
include balancing the policy objectives of trademark law with free
speech and integrating the commands of the First Amendment into
trademark doctrine. More fundamentally, clearer rules and faster
adjudication will increase the chances that expression using
trademarks becomes and remains available to our shared discourse.
In the end, that is really the only free speech goal. Until such
reform, for every happy ending in the law books like Freecycle,
there will be uncounted other individual decisions to forego or
withdraw speech, robbing us of its contributions.

